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One might have thought the everyday phenomenon of 
referring to an individual by name to be something less than a 
mystery, but the debate on proper names keeps spreading and 
the epidemic of theories goes unabated. 
Kent Bach 1987, 1 
 
It is easy nowadays to get caught up in direct-reference mania 
Salmon 1986, 82 
	  
Referentialist	  Turn	  
	  
Soames says “The job of semantics is to specify the principles by which sentences 
represent the world” (2008/9, 183). Indeed, this is the seemingly innocent conception 
of the problem of reference that Devitt (1981, xii) characterizes as the “age-old 
question about how language ‘hooks onto’ the world.” However, Pietroski (2003) 
suggests that “despite a considerable literature on this topic, no one has shown that 
names do bear any interesting and theoretically tractable relation to their bearers.” If 
he is correct, we are owed an explanation of how so many philosophers could have 
been so misguided. 
 
Indeed, it is widely acknowledged1 that externalism has become the orthodoxy about 
mental content. Kripke (1972) is regarded as having “ushered in a new era in 
philosophy” (Soames 2005, 1) – the “referentialist turn” (Bianchi 2012, 79) or 
“American referential realism” (Perry 2012, 4). This was the 1970s direct reference 
(DR) “revolution against Frege” (Wettstein 2004, 66) held to overturn a widely held 
descriptive conception of proper names. Despite a few voices of dissent against the 
Kripkean orthodoxy, recently Jackson (2010, 10) observes “It is still conventional 
wisdom that the description theory of proper names is false.” I wish to explore the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Farkas (2003a, b), Rey (2004), Segal (2004), Wikforss (2008), Boghossian (1998), Mendola (2008), 
Egan (1999). 
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heretical thought expressed by Fodor (2004) who ventured to wonder whether 
something has gone “awfully wrong” in this mainstream philosophical consensus, 
perhaps confirming Chomsky’s (1992) view that the whole field of philosophical 
semantics is “utterly wrongheaded” and “crazy” by virtue of its non-naturalist 
assumptions. I will argue that the mainstream anti-Fregean, anti-descriptivist 
orthodoxy is a version of a cognitive illusion we can see throughout philosophy of 
mind and cognitive science. Chomsky points to the diagnostic concern I wish to 
pursue: 
 
Here, I think, philosophers and linguists and others who are in the modern 
intellectual tradition are caught in a kind of trap, namely, the trap that assumes 
that there is a reference relation. (2012, 28) 
 
Word-thing relations are “mythical” by contrast with the question of “how the 
person’s mental representations enter into articulation and perception” (1996, 23), but 
this is syntax. Fodor (2000) expresses the inevitable puzzlement: “It’s not so clear that 
what Chomsky takes to be semantic truths actually are.” However, addressing the 
counter-intuitiveness of his view, Chomsky poses the aetiological question I take up 
here, suggesting that we may go beyond the usual analysis of those doctrines that 
have been assumed too uncritically “to ask why they seem so compelling” (2000b, 
105). 
 
Baffling,	  Vexatious,	  Little	  Choice?	  
 
Before turning directly to the semantic theories, then, we may consider the matter of 
intuitions which has become a hot topic of self-conscious interest among 
philosophers. In different guises, under such headings as ‘conceptual analysis’ 
(Jackson 1998) or ‘conceivability’ (Chalmers 2002), the deliverances of intuition have 
played a central role in philosophy (DePaul & Ramsey eds. 1998, Miscevic 2000, 
2006). In particular, the received externalist view of semantics rests on intuitions 
elicited by thought-experiments such as Putnam’s (1975) famous Twin Earth story, “a 
sort of paradigm in the philosophies of language and mind” (Segal 2000, 24). Also 
influential have been Kripke’s (1979) puzzle about Pierre’s seemingly contradictory 
beliefs, and his fiction about Gödel stealing the Incompleteness proof from Schmidt. 
Significantly, Kripke acknowledges	  that	  he	  was	  led	  by	  his	  “natural intuition” to the 
view that proper names are rigid designators. Kripke (1972/1980, 42) wrote: 
 
Of course, some philosophers think that something’s having intuitive content is 
very inconclusive evidence in favor of it. I think it is very heavy evidence in 
favour of anything, myself. I really don’t know, in a way, what more conclusive 
evidence one can have about anything, ultimately speaking. 
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Nevertheless, philosophers’ reliance on intuition has recently become the subject of 
intense controversy arising from empirical, experimental inquiries (X-Phi) that appear 
to challenge their reliability and universality (Weinberg et al. 2001, Machery et al. 
2004, Weinberg et al. 2010). I will suggest that this debate fails to address the most 
serious challenge to philosophers’ reliance on intuition. Both defenders and critics 
share an unexamined assumption, so that even conceding the strongest case to 
defenders of philosophers’ special expertise (e.g. Williamson 2011, Devitt 2011a) 
leaves them vulnerable to a fatal objection. 
 
Fodor (1987a) has noted that among the intuition-generating thought experiments, the 
Twin-Earth Problem “isn’t a problem; it’s just a handful of intuitions together with a 
commentary on some immediate implications of accepting them” (1987a, 208). 
Significantly, Fodor writes: 
 
… it is very plausible that all these intuitions hang together. The question is: 
What on earth do they hang on? (Fodor 1987a, 202). 
 
Farkas (2003b) characterizes the “deeply rooted” externalist intuitions as “baffling” 
and a “vexatious problem” that “poses a serious challenge for any attempts to give an 
internalist analysis.” Thus, we may ask why philosophers feel that the “intuitive 
responses to a certain kind of thought-experiment appear to leave them little choice,” 
as Boghossian (1998, 273) puts it. 
 
Giving	  Intuitions	  a	  Bad	  Name	  
 
Hintikka (1999, 127) has suggested intuitions “came into fashion in philosophy” as a 
consequence of the popularity of Chomsky’s linguistic methodology. Philosophers’ 
attempted to “get on the bandwagon of transformational grammar” that they took to 
provide a model for research into cognition. Hintikka (1999, 127,8) specifically cites 
Kripke’s (1972/1980) Naming and Necessity as an influential case in point, 
suggesting “Unfortunately, his reliance on intuitions in defending his idea of rigid 
reference is apt to give intuitions a bad name.”  
 
Contrary to Hintikka (1999, 132), Chomsky’s reasons for appealing to intuitions in 
generative linguistics have nothing to do with being a “self-acknowledged Cartesian” 
or with his theories about innate ideas. Nevertheless, Hintikka makes the important 
observation that the use of intuitions in linguistics is generally quite different from the 
role of intuitions in philosophy. Hintikka correctly notes, in contrast to linguists’ use 
of intuition, “philosophers’ intuitions do not pertain to the supposed faculty of 
intuition itself but to the truths about which this faculty is supposed to provide 
knowledge.” (Hintikka 1999, 133). For example, Bealer (1998, 202) argues that 
intuitions have a “strong modal tie to the truth” which he suggests “is a philosophical 
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(conceptual) thesis not open to empirical confirmation or refutation” and, moreover, 
“The defense of it is philosophical, ultimately resting on intuitions.” In the same vein, 
Chalmers (2002) asks “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?” challenging the 
systematic scientific picture obtained from the usual sources. However, if 
philosophers’ intuitions are taken properly on the model of generative linguistics, 
they may be valuable as psychological evidence rather than intimations of truth. This 
conception corresponds with what Stich (1996, 128) describes as “folk psychology 
construed internally.” On this view, “It is plausible to hypothesize that there is … a 
tacit theory, call it folk semantics, which guides people’s intuitive judgments about 
what terms refer to” (Stich 2009, 192). My suggestion is that, adopting this approach, 
Putnam-Kripke intuitions might be explained like the Müller-Lyer illusion as 
deceptive in spite of its subjective force. Of course, the model for this kind of inquiry 
into intuitive judgment is the ‘heuristics and biases’ research program initiated by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974, 1983). This work has demonstrated the systematic 
unreliability of compelling intuitions resulting in a wide range of cognitive illusions 
to which we are prone. 
 
“Reader’s	  Intelligence”	  
 
Chomsky (1962) has drawn attention to a pervasive error of theorizing, noting that a 
grammar may produce the illusion of explanatory completeness, but in fact have 
“serious limitations so far as linguistic science is concerned” because the success of 
the grammar depends on being “paired with an intelligent and comprehending 
reader.” This unnoticed reliance on the user’s ability is illegitimate because it is just 
what the theory is supposed to explain. That is, it is the reader and not the grammar 
that is doing a significant part of the work. Chomsky explains: “Reliance on the 
reader’s intelligence is so commonplace that is significance may be easily 
overlooked” (Chomsky 1962, 528,9). In one guise, the theorist ascribes mental 
representations as “semantically evaluable” based on his own knowledge of the truth 
rather than the subject’s beliefs. In this case, philosophical intuitions arise from tacitly 
adopting the perspective of an omniscient story-teller that Mario Vargas Llosa (1975) 
aptly refers to as the literary device of a “philosopher-narrator.”  
 
Experimental	  semantics	  	  	  
The question of intuitions has been illuminated from a new angle by empirical 
inquiries in experimental philosophy or the “X-Phi” movement (Weinberg et al. 2001, 
Machery et al. 2004).	   Cultural variation in intuitive judgements has brought into 
question the universality of the evidence on which philosophical puzzles have relied. 
For example, Segal (2004) objects to the externalist intuitions of Putnam and Kripke 
because “both Putnam and Kripke … mistakenly think that their intuitions are ‘ours’, 
that they are representative of those of all sensible, reflective humans” (2004, 340) – a 
failure of anthropological, psychological caution. For example, Segal reports studies 
of Twin-Earth intuitions among tribespeople such as the Mayans of the Yucatan in 
Mexico. The data are mixed, but Segal (2004, 343) says “surely” these data should be 
given considerably more weight than the intuitions of Putnam or Kripke. In the same 
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vein, Machery et al. (2004, B7) found that “Chinese subjects tended to have 
descriptivist intuitions, while Westerners tended to have Kripkean ones” and these 
data suggest “significant philosophical conclusions” about the theory of reference 
(2004, B1).  The authors conclude that it is “wildly implausible that the semantic 
intuitions of the narrow cross-section of humanity who are Western academic 
philosophers are a more reliable indicator of the correct theory of reference … than 
the differing semantic intuitions of other cultural or linguistic groups” (2004, B9).	  
 
Untrained	  Undergraduates	  &	  Unwashed	  Masses:	  The	  ‘Expertise	  
Defense’.	  
 
Responding to the empirical evidence of variation, Devitt thinks that experimental 
philosophers have tested the wrong subjects since the intuitions of ordinary folk are 
unreliable. He says “The intuitions we need are ones from people with some expertise 
in these matters, presumably metaphysicians and other philosophers” (2011a, 427). 
Hales (2012, 199) makes the same point, suggesting “it is the expert intuitions of 
professionally trained philosophers that have epistemic merit, not the uninformed 
reactions of the unwashed masses.” Devitt prefers “the intuitions of semanticists, 
usually philosophers” for the same reason we would prefer the intuitions of scientists 
such as physicists in their domain of expertise. The same “expertise defence” has also 
been articulated by Williamson (2011), but Weinberg et al. (2010, 335) conclude that 
there are key disanalogies between philosophy and other fields so that “playing the 
expertise card” does not trump sceptical concerns raised by the empirical evidence. 
Thus, “philosophers have no reason to expect, now, and from the armchair, that we 
are intuitive experts of the required sort” (Weinberg et al. 2010, 350) and 
“philosophers at this time cannot take it for granted that they are experts, in the 
relevant sense here.” Replying to this tentative and qualified scepticism, Williamson 
(2011) suggests that “elaborate invocation of the expertise literature” is too general to 
apply to philosophers’ special case and, therefore, the available evidence is not 
decisive. He says philosophers need not “suspend their current projects” to investigate 
their own competence in making intuitive judgments just because “undergraduates 
untrained in philosophy are bad at conducting thought experiments” (2011, 217). This 
is a somewhat qualified response to inconclusive criticism. At worst, we have a stand-
off in which the two sides disagree about the force of the empirical evidence. Indeed, 
among critics of intuition-based philosophy, Stich (2009, 232) suggests, at worst, that 
a practitioner has cause for “getting pretty nervous,” but he concedes no one can 
claim that anything has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt.  
 
However, the burgeoning literature on experimental philosophy appears to be 
irrelevant to the most serious challenge faced by philosophical reliance on intuitions. 
Stich’s conclusion that a great deal of previous philosophy “belongs in the rubbish 
bin” (2009, 232) seems to be misconceived even if the empirical evidence were 
entirely beyond reasonable doubt as Stich (2012) has recently insisted. Indeed, he 
cites evidence suggesting that even the Müller-Lyer illusion is not universally shared 
among all human cultures, but it is no help to be told that someone else doesn’t share 
your puzzlement. If I am the only one who is guilty of confirmation bias or base-rate 
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neglect, I need diagnosis and a cure, not anthropology. Who cares what the Maya 
think? Their failure to be puzzled doesn’t help resolve our problems, even if they are 
parochial to Western departments of analytic philosophy. On the other hand, even if 
Nagel (2012) is right and there is no cultural variation among people in their intuitive 
judgments about philosophically important cases, there may still be good reason for 
philosophers to be nervous. Even if the intuitions of interest were universally shared, 
their credentials and reliability are not thereby established. Hales (2012) makes an 
extended argument for construing rational intuition as a mental faculty closely 
analogous to perception (see also Sosa 2007, 101). But, of course, this just invites the 
obvious question about the problem of systematic biases and inherent illusions.  
 
Thus, the ‘expertise defence’ is to no avail against the criticism that expert judgment 
is specially prone to error precisely because of professional education and training. 
The point is hardly new since it is just Wittgenstein’s Tractatus complaint about the 
conceptual confusions that have constituted the entire history of philosophy. We see 
the same idea in Kant’s concern with “paralogisms of pure reason.” As Kant puts it, 
these are not mere errors “in which a bungler might be entangled” but rather, a 
“natural and unavoidable illusion” (Kant 1781, A298, 386). The irony of emphasis on 
philosophers’ professional training is that this is exactly the mechanism for 
inculcating widely shared biases and systematic errors. It was in this spirit that G.E. 
Moore (1925) famously remarked “I do not think the world or the sciences would 
ever have suggested to me any philosophical problems. What has suggested 
philosophical problems to me is things which other philosophers have said about the 
world.” Famously, Chomsky’s (1959) review of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior exposed 
errors that were shared among professional experts throughout the discipline of 
psychology. Galileo, too, was principally opposed by the academic experts of his 
time, the professional philosophers, whose Aristotelian intuitions were the source of 
their resistance to Copernicanism. 
 
Devitt (2011b) acknowledges that expert bias is a hazard, but he points out that it is an 
“inescapable risk” that we always run in scientific theorizing. Indeed, there is no 
higher court of appeal than our best scientific conjectures. However, it is a 
characteristic feature of the intuition-based philosophical doctrines that they are in 
stark conflict with our best science. Consider the immense literature on contra-causal 
freedom of choice, or the vast literature on qualia, the conceivability of zombies and 
immaterial consciousness. If philosophers’ intuitions were like forefront scientific 
theories, we could have no grounds for objecting to the ‘expertise defence.’ However, 
philosophers’ expert Kripkean intuitions are contrary to the best scientific 
considerations. We discount our intuitions of the Müller-Lyer lines because we can 
measure them. Similarly, in the famous example (Tversky & Kahneman 1983), we 
discount our intuitions concerning Linda the feminist bank-teller because we have a 
normative theory of probability. Accordingly, by analogy with the methods of 
perceptual psychology and also generative linguistics, we may approach 
philosophers’ semantic intuitions as data for a theory of ‘tacit knowledge’ or 
‘competence’ (or, in this case, incompetence).  	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Residue	  of	  Commonsense	  
 
Specifically, I suggest we may discern the mechanism of “the trap that assumes there 
is a reference relation” (Chomsky 2012, 28). The assumption is natural and 
compelling, shared among theorists who may differ on other fundamental issues.  
Chomsky blames the mythical conception of mind-world relations on a “residue of 
commonsense” and Egan (1999, 187), too, notes that a sign of theoretical progress is 
often the departure of our theories from folk-science. But lessons from the history of 
science and homilies on the Galilean approach fail to address the particular 
persuasiveness of the commonsense picture in this case. Chomsky (2000b, 148) holds 
that we can have no intuitions about thought experiments such as the Twin Earth 
scenario because the key terms “extension”, “reference”, “true of” and “denote” are 
technical inventions. In the same way, it would be pointless to explore our intuitions 
about “tensors” or “undecidability.” However, there can be no doubt that certain 
intuitions may be consistently induced by the notorious thought experiments. These 
are not random in the way that intuitions about tensors or other technical concepts 
might be among the uninitiated. Devitt (2011b, 25) notes “We can probably assume 
that nearly all philosophers of language agree with Kripkean intuitions about Gödel 
cases” (see also Hughes 2004, vii).    
 
Perspective	  on	  Ourselves	  from	  Outside:	  The	  Spectre	  of	  Gettier.	  
 
We see these intuitions in the doctrinal shift of the 1970s direct reference “revolution 
against Frege” (Wettstein 2004, 66) and against the idea that the reference of a word 
“is grounded in the mind’s grasp of the item in question.” The “radical suggestion” of 
direct reference theorists involves rejection of the idea that “something about the 
speaker’s cognitive state” is relevant. That is, reference can be “cognitively 
unmediated” (Wettstein 2004, 13). Soames (2009, 183) explains, “Semantic theories 
do not state that which a speaker knows in virtue of which he or she is semantically 
competent.”  
 
Towards the goal of elucidating these “baffling” and “vexatious” externalist 
intuitions, it is helpful to notice a close parallel between philosophical problems that 
are generally treated in isolation from one another. Thus, Burge (2012) recently 
explains the nature of de re belief in terms that are suggestive of other familiar 
problems. He notes, “One can have a de re belief that is successfully referential and 
meets all other conditions on being de re, which nevertheless fails to count as 
knowledge.” Burge suggests a case in which one is looking directly at an object and 
that one forms a true belief about it, but one has reason to doubt that there is really an 
object there, having been fooled in the past. Burge’s scenario is easily illustrated. 
Consider the case in which someone is looking at a chair which he can see in a certain 
position apparently in the next room. However, he doesn’t notice that he is looking at 
a large mirror and, therefore, sees the reflection of a chair that is actually nearer to 
him in the same room. As it happens, there is an identical chair in the next room 
behind the mirror, exactly where the reflection appears to be. In such circumstances, 
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Burge (2012, 119, fn. 12) suggests, one has a de re belief of the object, but one lacks 
knowledge. Of course, it is evident that this is exactly the Gettier Problem (1963). 
Burge doesn’t mention Gettier, but these parallels suggest the Problem has a wider 
interest beyond the epistemological issues it has been directly concerned with.  
 
In Chisholm’s (1966) version of the classical story, the subject sees a sheep-like bush 
and acquires a perceptual belief “There is a sheep in the field.” Although this belief is 
justified by the evidence, it is true only by accident because, unbeknownst to him, 
there is a sheep elsewhere in the field. The classical criteria are met, but the belief 
does not count as knowledge. Lycan (2006) does not think that the Gettier problem 
deserves the widespread opprobrium and suggests “So far as has been shown, there is 
nothing particularly wrong with the Gettier Problem.” On the contrary, however, I 
offer a diagnosis of the intuition on which it rests, concurring with Baz (2012, 329) in 
a suggestive footnote. Philosophers have in general failed to appreciate the difference 
between typical thought experiments and actual cases of everyday thinking. Baz 
(2012) notes, by contrast with real life examples of belief, in Gettier puzzles “we, the 
readers of the example … already know, on the basis of an assurance that in earthly 
matters only God could provide,” the truth of the subject’s belief. It’s the same 
intuition underlying semantic theories in philosophy.  
 
Hetherington (2012) has recently given an analysis of the Gettier problem as an 
“epistemological chimera” and “illusion.” Hetherington distinguishes “beliefs as such” 
from “Gettiered beliefs,” the latter being cases in which “truth remains essential.” His 
diagnosis is “People reacting in the standard way to Gettier cases are being 
infallibilists, without realizing this about themselves.” This is another way of making 
the point about puzzles that arise from the “narrator’s” omniscience. Indeed, the 
spectre of Gettier hangs over much philosophy and cognitive science. The puzzles of 
Twin Earth and meaning arise in the same way because of the alleged semantic 
evaluability of mental content. This is the feature that makes Twin Oscar’s belief 
about water different from Oscar’s despite the identity of their internal states. Burge 
(1988) puts it explicitly in terms that support the analysis I have been suggesting, 
saying “We take up a perspective on ourselves from the outside.”  
 
Who	  is	  in	  the	  know?	  
 
Boghossian’s (1998) characterization of the Twin Earth thought-experiment is 
suggestive of the parallels I have noted between the puzzles of semantics and the 
Gettier Problem. He writes of our “full knowledge” that a term ‘water’ refers to a 
kind, namely H2O and “That knowledge plays a central role in the experiment” 
(Bohghossian 1998, 278). Indeed, this is just Baz’s (2012) insight concerning Gettier 
Problems in which reference to what we learn and what we know is a key to the 
intuitions evoked. On Putnam’s (1975, 11) account, if the chemical difference 
between our water and XYZ is scientifically inaccessible to us, we might never 
discover that they differ. Nevertheless, we are to assume that “Oscar1 and Oscar2 
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understood the term “water” differently in 1750 although they were in the same 
psychological state.” Crane (1996, 292) has forcefully noted this problem in 
Putnam’s account suggesting “This cannot be right.” In Crane’s (1996, 292) useful 
phrase, the question of who is “in the know” is central to untangling the intuitions at 
the heart of puzzles concerning externalism.  
 
The invisibility of our own role and our own knowledge creates the illusion noted by 
Crane (1996, 293): “the Twin Earth cases are meant to demonstrate that the world 
itself can, as it were, fix the meanings of some of our words.” Crane’s apt 
characterization captures the paranormal or clairvoyant conception of meanings which 
somehow link the mind directly with its objects in the world. The intuition arises from 
our “being in the know” as philosopher-narrator.  
	  
Indeed, the diagnosis of the malaise is confirmed by its sufferers. Far from regarding 
it as problematic, the conception of an “omniscient observer” has been explicitly 
embraced by Donnellan (1974) and endorsed by Almog (2004) in their externalist 
accounts of naming, as we will see. Kaplan (2012, 156), too, describes the vantage 
point of the theorist as “description from above” which is an understanding “in which 
one surveys another’s thought” from a point of view “independent of whether the 
subject’s thought corresponds to reality.”2 This is the source of the intuition generated 
by the Gettier Problem and the Twin Earth scenario. That is, externalism depends on 
intuitions arising from the theorist’s knowing about the chemistry of water in 
Putnam’s case, just as we know of the sheep beyond the subject’s ken in Gettier’s 
case. Indeed, we see the parallel in Donnellan’s (1966) example of the sentence “The 
man drinking the martini” which can be used to refer to something it fails to denote – 
namely, the person the speaker has in mind who is actually drinking water and not the 
person in the next room who is drinking a martini. Although this case has not received 
the opprobrium of the Gettier Problem, it is clearly identical. 
 
Experimenter	  Bias	  in	  the	  Armchair?	  
 
In light of this analysis, it is not surprising that Kripke’s (1972/1980) story about 
Schmidt and Gödel is also a variant of Gettier’s scenario. In this fiction proposed as a 
counter-example to the descriptivist account of names, Schmidt is the real discoverer 
of the famous Incompleteness Proof for which Gödel has claimed credit. Kripke 
suggests that the name ‘Gödel’ must still refer to Gödel and not Schmidt, even if the 
only thing we knew about the name was the description “Discoverer of the 
Incompleteness Theorem.” This description is just like “the sheep in the field” and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	   Putnam gives analogous diagnosis of the externalist perspective on metaphysical realism which 
adopts a “God’s Eye point of view” (1981, 49). Davidson (1977/2001, 201), too, explicitly raises the 
problematic assumption in relation to his truth-conditional view of semantics: “there is nothing absurd 
in the idea of an omniscient interpreter.” (See Mendola 2008, 258). Lepore and Ludwig (2005, 322) 
remark, “Davidson has said in conversation that he wished he had never mentioned the omniscient 
interpreter” (2005, 322), but they give no indication of his reasons. 
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“the man drinking martini” in applying by accident to something other than the 
intended object. The puzzles about whether the cases are real knowledge or real 
reference are structurally identical. In a different example, Kripke (1980, 85) 
mentions Peano, who is often credited with formulating the number-theoretic axioms 
that are really due to Dedekind. A speaker holding the common, mistaken view using 
the name “Peano” will “hold a false belief about Peano, not a true belief about 
Dedekind” (Kripke 1980, 89). This is just as we may say about Gettier’s subject who 
holds a false belief about the bush and not a true belief about the sheep. 
  
In seeking to diagnose the intuitions, it helps to notice that the truth-making fact is 
known to the theorist who ascribes belief – the ubiquitous omniscient narrator – but 
not the subject to whom belief is ascribed. Our intuition elicited by Kripke’s 
Gödel/Schmidt story depends entirely on the fact that we acquire new information and 
a new description associated with the name ‘Gödel’ – that is, “the man who didn’t 
discover the incompleteness of arithmetic, but killed Schmidt and took the credit.” 
Under these circumstances, our intuitions about what someone else might be referring 
to when using the name “Gödel” are of little interest as far as a scientific theory of 
semantics is concerned. Kripke encourages conflating our roles as theorist and 
subject, and we rely on intuitions generated by “being in the know” about facts that 
are not available to the subjects whose naming competence we are trying to 
understand. Whether their naming ability is best explained descriptively or in some 
other way is a matter of cognitive science or psycholinguistics that is not illuminated 
by how anyone “in the know” might describe such a subject. How could the truth 
about Gödel’s crime and plagiarism be relevant to explaining naming ability on the 
part of a subject who doesn’t know? That is, it seems clear that the correctness of a 
Fregean descriptive account of names can’t be challenged by discovering a new 
description known only to the theorist/ascriber and not the subject whose naming 
ability we want to explain. Whether philosophers or others intuitively regard a 
speaker to be holding a false belief about Gödel or a true belief about Schmidt has no 
bearing on the explanatory problems semantics. The puzzle arises partly from 
neglecting Devitt’s (1984) important distinction between belief and belief ascription 
(see also Heck 2012, Michael 2010).  
 
Philosophers,	  Autistics	  &	  Three	  Year	  Olds.	  
 
In response to the orthodoxy in semantics, though notably bearing also on the Gettier 
Problem, Farkas’ (2003b) argues that “external features are important only if they are 
incorporated into the internal cognitive or experiential perspective of cognizers.” 
Schantz, too, says “As far as psychological explanation is concerned, what counts is 
how the world is internally represented as being, not how the world really is (2004, 
23; emphasis added).” This is essentially Fodor’s (1998, 20) diagnosis of externalism, 
– the view that “what you are thinking depends on what world you’re in.” Schantz’ 
prescription is apt also for capturing the mistaken “theory of mind” in a different 
domain. Central problems in philosophy of language and mind have a striking, 
unnoticed analogue known to clinical psychologists in the Wimmer and Perner (1983) 
“false belief” task: Autistics and three year-olds ascribe beliefs to others based on 
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their own knowledge of the truth rather than on the other’s justified beliefs. The child 
observes a scene in which a person or fictional character such as Kermit the Frog is 
shown a piece of candy placed in one of two closed boxes. When Kermit leaves the 
room briefly, the experimenter observed by the child places the candy in the other 
box. The child is then asked which box Kermit will look in to find the candy when he 
re-enters the room. Autistics and three year-old children will nominate the box to 
which the candy has been moved rather than the original box. That is, their ascription 
of beliefs to others is based on their own knowledge of the truth rather than on the 
other’s justified beliefs.  
 
It appears that philosophers make the same mistake that children grow out of by the 
age of four. This insight permits us to make a catalogue and taxonomy of puzzles that 
arise in the same way. In the first set (A), we have belief ascription that goes awry 
when the truth-maker is someone or something else, unknown to the subject. In the 
second set (B) to be considered presently, we have Frege Puzzle cases in which 
different belief ascriptions apply to the same person or thing.  
 
Category A. Gettier Cases: 
 
(1) The sheep in the field (Gettier) 
(2) The man drinking a martini (Donnellan) 
(3) The water in the lake (Putnam) 
(4) The discoverer of the Incompleteness Proof (Kripke) 
(5) The chair in the next room (Burge) 
 
 
 
Category B. Frege Cases: 
 
 
 
(6) The morning star (Frege) 
(7) The evening star 
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(8) The man in the brown hat (Quine) 
(9) The man seen at the beach 
 
(10)  La ville qui s’appelle Londres (Kripke) 
(11) The city called London 
 
In Gettier/Putnam cases we can have the same belief about different objects (H2O and 
XYZ) whereas in the Quine/Kripke case we can have different beliefs about the same 
object (Ortcutt/London). Putnam’s stratagem of changing worlds is analogous to 
making the “Gettiered” belief false by taking the unseen truth-maker sheep out of the 
paddock, or switching the candy when Kermit isn’t looking. 
 
Ralph	  and	  Pierre:	  Thoughts	  and	  Their	  Ascription.	  	  
The foregoing analysis permits us to see the source of Kripke’s (1979/2011) “Puzzle 
About Belief.” This puzzle has generated a considerable literature suggesting that it 
remains the case, as he says, “No answer has yet been given.” Indeed, Kripke regards 
the puzzle as comparable to the Liar Paradox (1979, 904/156) and Salmon (2011, 
236) endorses Kripke’s “sound methodology” quoting Tarski’s classic discussion of 
the Liar antinomy and its intellectual challenge. Not knowing that Londres and 
London are the same city, Pierre believes that ‘Londres est jolie’ but denies ‘London 
is pretty.’ It appears that we must ascribe a contradiction to Pierre, though he is a 
perfectly rational person. Kripke says “I know of no answer” to the question “Does 
Pierre, or does he not, believe that London is pretty” (Kripke 1979, 895/147). He says 
“I have no firm belief as to how to solve it.” (2011, 147), though he acknowledges “I 
am fully aware that complete and straightforward descriptions of the situation are 
possible and that in this sense there is no paradox” (1979, 895/147). Kripke is 
emphatic that talk of ‘what is really going on’ cannot resolve the problem. He insists 
“none of this answers the original question” namely “Does Pierre, or does he not, 
believe that London is pretty?” He says “I know of no answer to this question that 
seems satisfactory” (1979, 895,6). Accordingly, Kripke’s “primary moral” is that “the 
puzzle is a puzzle” (1979/2011, 156) and that it can not be resolved by re-describing 
it. However, a re-description need not avoid the problem but rather show how it 
arises. After all, the indeterminacy of Pierre’s belief about London is not like the 
contradictory state of Shrödinger’s cat or the quantum wave/particle duality. To be 
sure, in some cases such as Zeno’s story of Achilles and the Tortoise, restating the 
problem (e.g. with a distance/time graph) is to sidestep the puzzle rather than solving 
it since the re-description doesn’t expose the flaw in Zeno’s reasoning. Kripke is right 
to say that talk of ‘what is really going on’ doesn’t answer the original question, but it 
does show clearly what’s wrong with the original question and why the puzzle isn’t a 
puzzle, after all. With Kripke, we can point out that “No answer has yet been given” 
to the question of whether Lois Lane loves Clark Kent or whether she believes Clark 
Kent can fly, but we understand why.  
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Figure 1. Necker Cube. 
 
Or, seeing the Necker Cube on two different occasions, Pierre might not recognize it 
as the same geometrical figure. Adapting Kripke’s (1979/2011, 148) words we may 
ask “Does Pierre, or does he not, believe that the Figure (not the shape satisfying 
such-and-such descriptions, but the Figure) is facing upwards to the left? No answer 
has yet been given.” Fodor (2008, 76) pointedly asks “But why on earth should we 
suppose that the question [concerning Pierre] has a definite right answer when it’s 
phrased that way? And, once one sees why it doesn’t, why does it matter that it 
doesn’t?” However, while sharing Fodor’s dismissive attitude, we may go further to 
ask why the puzzle should have such a firm grip on philosophical imagination.  	  
Thus, Devitt (1984, 385; 1990) has made a salutary distinction: “Thoughts are one 
thing, their ascription another.” Devitt warns “it is a common practice … to use 
‘belief’, for example, where what one means to refer to is belief ascription” (1984, 
389). The failure to respect Devitt’s distinction is to blame for Kripke’s puzzle in 
which we seem forced to describe the hapless Frenchman as holding contradictory 
beliefs about London. The intuition that we can be induced to share is simply the idea 
that we can ascribe de re beliefs from our own perspective independently of the 
beliefs of the subject in question.	  Brandom (1994, 503, 590) explains, “expressions 
that occur within the scope of the ‘that’ [in de dicto contexts] serve to specify how 
things are represented by the one to whom the belief is ascribed.” Brandom (1994) 
says it is Kripke’s disquotational principle that “causes all the trouble” though it is 
regarded by Kripke as “a self-evident truth”: 
 
“If a normal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely assents to ‘p’, then he 
believes that p.” 
 
Devitt suggests that Kripke’s disquotational principle is false as an empirical matter. 
If a normal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely assents to ‘p’, then that is merely 
good, rather than conclusive, evidence that the speaker believes that p. But it’s not the 
empirical incidence of contrary cases that is the problem with Kripke’s principle. 
Rather the problem is that the formula relies on using ‘p’ disquoted in our own 
language. Kripke’s disquotational principle has an affinity with Davidson’s T-schema 
of truth-conditional semantics and echoes the interpretative conception he shares with 
Quine. The second, disquoted, use of ‘p’ is in the metalanguage understood by the 
theorist who ascribes ‘p.’ The parallels are ubiquitous. Brandom (1994, 502) notes 
that we are rehearsing Quine’s emphasis on the grammatical difference between 
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referentially transparent and opaque contexts in de re propositional-attitude-ascribing 
locutions. Thus, we can see how perspectival ambiguity and the corresponding 
intuitions are generated in Quine’s famous sentences corresponding with (8) and (9) 
above: 
 
(12) Ralph believes that the man in the brown hat is a spy. 
(13) Ralph does not believe that the man seen at the beach is a spy. 
 
As Quine (1966, 185) had noted, Ralph does not know it but the men are one and the 
same. Quine’s puzzle is evidently the same as Kripke’s puzzle about Pierre. Quine 
asks, “Can we say of this man (Bernard J. Ortcutt, to give him a name) that Ralph 
believes him to be a spy?” Kripke asks, Can we say of this city London, that Pierre 
thinks it is beautiful? Quine, like Kripke, notes that we appear to find ourselves 
ascribing a contradiction.  
 
Direct	  Reference:	  Contentious,	  Murky	  Waters.	  
 
Donnellan’s conception of what a speaker “has in mind” appears to be a 
“psychological model” (Bianchi (2012), but as Wettstein (2012, 104) reveals, “we 
have entered more contentious, even murkier waters.” Wettstein is concerned about a 
hint of descriptivism or “the scent of Russell” in Donnellan’s attempt to ensure that a 
speaker is “appropriately connected” with the person he has in mind. Accordingly, 
this “cognitive connection” must be constrained so that one can’t just “use the definite 
description “the murderer of Smith” to refer to the number 3” (2012 105 fn. 7). In 
exactly the same terms, Fodor and Lepore (1992) asked, “Why can’t you have a 
sentence that has an inferential role appropriate to the thought that water is wet, but is 
true iff 4 is prime?” (1992, 171) What is the glue that keeps meaning and reference 
stuck together and precludes such radical mismatches? This is, of course, Fodor’s 
earlier question: What makes a computer program play chess rather than simulate the 
Six Day War (Fodor 1978, 207). Fodor and Lepore say that no adequate semantics 
could allow an expression whose intension and extension were so radically 
disconnected. They ask “What on earth would it mean?” (1992, 170). Presumably, 
this question asks how we might conceivably understand an expression whose 
intension and extension diverged in this way. However, unless it is merely a façon de 
parler, the very question is inappropriate and suggests that the problem may arise 
precisely from conceiving the explanatory problem in terms of how we might 
intuitively understand mental representations as distinct from how we might explain 
them. 
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Empty	  Names 
 
For Donnellan, the appropriate link and constraint is provided by his “history-oriented 
view about what it is to have something in mind.” However, he is confronted by the 
puzzle of “empty names” arising from Millian theories of reference.3 Donnellan 
(1974) describes it as “one of the major puzzles” for a theory of reference: “How can 
one say something about what does not exist?” (1974, 3). However, from an 
explanatory, scientific point of view, it is difficult to see why empty or non-referring 
names should be grounds for perplexity. Devitt (1989, 211) has noted that the 
meaningfulness of a name does not depend on whether it has a reference, but we will 
see that his solution rests on essentially the same intuitive illusion. The non-existence 
of Robin Hood or Moses is an empirical matter that has no bearing on the cognitive 
states of a competent user of the names. It is significant that Donnellan offers his 
account in terms of “an omniscient observer of history [who] would see an 
individual” with the appropriate connections to the name. In accord with the standard 
conception of the semantic enterprise, such historical explanation provides “the 
relationship between the use of a referring expression and the referent.” However, 
Donnellan’s device of the omniscient observer offers a remarkable insight into the 
intuitions captured by the causal-historical theory. It confirms the aptness of the 
metaphor that I have used here – Vargas Llosa’s invisible narrador-filósofo 
omnisciente –  who is “in the know.”  
 
If someone were not already in the thrall of an intuitively seductive, but bizarre 
picture, the puzzle of empty names could hardly arise or be taken seriously. In 
particular, there is a widespread neglect of the most obvious fact to which Reimer 
(2001, 504) draws attention, “It is, after all, language – and not reality – that we are 
interested in analyzing when we try to understand the workings of empty names.” 
Donnellan (1974, 25) himself addresses this point directly but it is a remarkable fact 
that he entirely sidesteps the question with no further comment. However, the issue 
generates a clear reductio ad absurdum of the direct reference assumptions from 
which it arises. Reimer (2001, 501) says it is “an undeniable empirical fact” that 
speakers of a language are unreflectively inclined to suppose that we can refer to 
things that do not exist.” Could they be mistaken? It is also an undeniable fact that in 
acquiring a competent use of names, people may not know, and may never learn, that 
some of their names are empty. Entire civilizations have arisen and flourished on 
belief in things that do not exist and to which they referred. It is obvious that, 
whatever their other difficulties, they were not suffering from linguistic problems.  
 
The claims are subject to easy empirical test. If we consider typical psycholinguistic 
experiments with children (e.g. Crain and Thornton 2000), a child could acquire two 
new names without knowing that only one of them has a real denotation. In a 
“double-blind” condition, it’s a safe prediction that the experimenter could not 
determine from the children’s naming ability which is the empty name. In particular, 
Braun’s (1993) idea that there is some defect in sentences with empty names in being 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Donnellan 1974, Braun 1993 and Reimer 2001. 
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“gappy” is an implausible, indeed desperate, gambit. The gappiness is in the world, 
not in language. The pseudo-problem of empty names recalls Fodor’s remark on the 
hapless frog that snaps at the experimenter’s BB rather than a fly. The frog is not to 
blame. As Fodor says, “it is not the frog but the world that has gone wrong” (quoted 
in Millikan 1991, 161). 
 
Co-­‐Thinkers	  
 
Given the direct reference point of view, a related problem arises for explaining how 
two different minds can be “co-thinkers, minds focused on the same thing” (Almog 
2004, 394). Almog explains how the rival “classical” descriptive theory fails to 
account for “trans-mind cross-identification” of content: 
 
What makes the two co-thinkers is not a common internal content but an 
external fact, probably unknown to both, but available to what Donnellan called 
‘the omniscient observer of the history’ – an ‘omniscient’ investigator, having 
all the pertinent facts accessible by stipulation … (Almog 2004, 394)  
  
Almog makes a remarkably explicit endorsement of a semantic enterprise that resorts 
to facts that have no explanatory relevance. On this conception, “the semantics of the 
market-place language may only be given from the ‘outside’, by the omniscient 
observer of history” (Almog 2004, 409). That is, “the semantical rules describe our 
language ‘from above’ and are not cognitively accessible meanings” (2004, 411).  
 
Linguistic	  Contact	  Without	  Cognitive	  Contact.	  
 
Despite Donnellan’s allusion to the idea of “having in mind,” in fact, the theories in 
question make no explanatory appeal to anything in mind at all. Donnellan takes a 
cognitive connection to be the historical, perhaps causal, connection between a mental 
event or speech act and the referent. As we will see, this is evidently Devitt’s story 
too, but it is a cognitive account in name only. On a different conception that Bianchi 
terms the “social model,” even the empty gestures towards “having in mind” are 
dropped. It is denied that the mind is relevant in determining reference. Wettstein 
(2004) expounds this view, based on rejecting what he calls “linguistic Cartesianism” 
in favour of notions of a public language and social practices. Wettstein’s conception 
is perhaps the most radical and, therefore, the most revealing, not least because of its 
commonalities with Devitt’s rival account to be discussed presently. Wettstein 
repudiates “the contents of thought” taken to “reside in the mind, in the head” (2004, 
61). Among the reasons for “supplanting” purely “thought-oriented” linguistic 
Cartesianism is the risk we have seen that an individuating description might fail to be 
“correct.” Devitt (1989) has recognized the occult character of direct reference 
theories which he has criticized (1989, 2012) as contrary to a naturalistic, scientific 
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view, as if names refer by “magic” (Devitt 1989, 211).4 Wettstein (2004) defends his 
slogan “linguistic contact without cognitive contact” on grounds that he takes to be 
empirical rather than merely “philosophical” (2004, 70, 77). However, Wettstein’s 
arguments are acutely ironic in view of the occult nature of the claimed “direct 
reference” relation. Indeed, Wettstein acknowledges “we need not reject the sense that 
there is something magical at work here” (2004, 112). Moreover, Wettstein ignores 
the overwhelming empirical evidence of mental intermediaries and advocates exactly 
the doctrine that Fodor has ridiculed as the “miracle” theory – namely, a version of 
Reid’s “direct perception” (2004, 142).5 
 
Wettstein rhetorically turns the tables characterizing the cognitive approach as 
looking “beyond the natural world, to Fregean senses in a third realm” and thereby to 
“posit nonnatural relations” which are an “unanalysable” kind of “spookiness” (2004, 
111) “like positing a god” (2004, 105), lacking genuine explanatory force. In his 
view, naturalistic inquiry would eschew a notion like Frege’s sense as “a purely 
spiritual substance” like “the soul of a word” (2004, 100). It is true that Frege did not 
regard senses or modes of presentation as psychological, but there is no doubt that 
Frege’s insights depended on a cognitive, conceptual understanding of the key 
distinction between sense and reference. Regardless of Frege’s own view, the much-
maligned “Cartesian” conception is entirely defensible on empirical, scientific 
grounds. If there is admittedly little known about internal cognitive mechanisms 
responsible for language abilities including naming and reference, it is at the very 
least an empirically plausible, perhaps the only, candidate for an explanation of 
phenomena such as the Frege puzzles concerning the informativeness and “cognitive 
values” of “a = b.” Indeed, Wettstein admits “I realize that I’m not supplying what the 
Fregean is seeking” (2004, 110), and significantly adds “But there is nothing more to 
tell.” Thus, Wettstein suggests instead of concern with the mind and “how someone is 
thinking of ‘Aristotle’ when he uses the name,” semantics should be focused on social 
practice (2004, 134). “We should abandon the Fregean explanatory project” to  
consider “full blown practices” (2004, 112). Of course, there can be no argument 
against the choice to pursue a certain kind of inquiry rather than another. However, 
the renunciation of the most plausible account of names leads him to the bizarre 
conclusion that “I can talk and think about [someone] … because I am a member of a 
linguistic community that has a name for him” (2004, 168). This is a kind of 
behaviourism that rejects Fregean “modes of presentation” as “a misleading 
characterization of our mental lives” (2004, 139).  
 
Above all, rejecting internal, mental representations and a “thought-oriented” 
approach altogether is hardly justified, following Wittgenstein, on the grounds that 
depictive, pictorial images are a bad idea. Wettstein makes a remarkable, unwitting 
admission of the fatal flaw to which I have been drawing attention. Regarding the 
difference in cognitive informativeness between sentences such as “a = b” and “a = 
a,” Wettstein says “my idea is that we don’t really need to render the datum 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Jeshion (2006, 33) refers to a “whiff of a kind of mysticism” in Wettstein’s account. 
5 I have argued (Slezak 2004) that Fodor’s targets Reid and Putnam are not guilty of Fodor’s charge. 
Wettstein is (2004, 100). 
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intelligible; it’s intelligible, unproblematic, on the face of it” (2004, 142; emphasis 
added). Of course, the datum is indeed intelligible “on the face of it” – that is, to us as 
theorists. 
 
Mode	  of	  Presentation	  
 
Although critical of direct reference theories, Devitt also rejects Frege’s 
“intellectualized,” Cartesian account. Accordingly, before turning directly to his 
analysis, we may usefully revisit Frege’s (1892/1970, 57) classic discussion of senses 
as modes of presentation in his ‘On Sense and Reference.’ Although widely 
repudiated, my suggestion is that Frege’s conception of “differing cognitive value” 
deserves to be taken seriously and literally in terms of a descriptive or conceptual 
representation. In particular, Frege’s account is consistent with an avowedly 
psychological interpretation as we would understand this today. Although Frege 
rejected a psychological understanding of sense, he distinguished it from an “idea” 
which is a “wholly subjective,” idiosyncratic mental representation. By contrast, for 
Frege, “sense” is an abstraction and idealization from individual thoughts identified 
with “the mode of presentation of that which is designated.” Sense and mode of 
representation determine “the thought expressed” and, thereby, “actual knowledge.” 
In these explicitly cognitive terms, Frege speaks of “grasping a sense” when we 
understand a word, and it is clear that we may take this in an appropriately qualified 
psychological sense now familiar in cognitive science. How else? In this vein, 
Dummett (1973, 94) glosses “cognitive value” as “information content.” Frege takes 
sense to be an ingredient of meaning “where meaning is that which a man knows 
when he understands a word” (1973, 95). Despite being widely scorned in the wake of 
the Kripkean revolution, Frege’s conception of sense and mode of presentation seem 
perfectly plausible, understood as internal, intellectual, conceptual processes. Above 
all, nothing in Frege’s account suggests the kind of mysterious posits that Wettstein 
characterizes pejoratively as “Cartesian.” Frege’s illustration of a mode of 
presentation is clear enough to refute these misplaced criticisms. Frege writes,  
 
Let a, b, c be the lines connecting the vertices of a triangle with the midpoints of 
the opposite sides. The point of intersection of a and b is then the same as the 
point of intersection of b and c. So we have different designations for the same 
point, and these names (‘point of intersection of a and b,’ ‘point of intersection 
of b and c’) likewise indicate the mode of presentation; and hence the statement 
[of identity] contains actual knowledge. (Frege, 1892/1970, 57) 
  
Above all, Frege’s geometrical illustration makes it clear that “point of intersection of 
a and b” is a description that we understand in the perfectly ordinary way – a matter 
of internal psychological, conceptual processing, though of a more abstract idealized 
kind than an individual “idea.” Taking up Wettstein’s parallel between reference and 
perception (see also Salmon 1991, 122 and Burge 2012, 111), we may pose 
Wettstein’s Fregean question as we did before using the Necker Cube: He asks “How 
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one can be in touch with the same thing twice over without knowing this fact?” 
(Wettstein 2004, 141). The answer is obvious and the analogy with Frege’s 
Hesperus/Phosphorus case is clear. It is cognitively informative to be told or shown 
that one object is identical with another for exactly the reasons Frege appreciated – 
namely, the different senses or modes of presentation understood as psychological 
information processing.  
 
What	  ties	  the	  ability	  to	  the	  object?	  
 
Devitt acknowledges that the difference in meaning between “a = a” and “a = b” “is 
about as powerful a semantic intuition as we have” (2012). In this regard, Devitt 
(forthcoming) accepts that “Frege was right in thinking that a name had a sense” 
(1989, 211) and that a name’s “sense” is its mode of “presenting” its bearer, but he 
holds Frege was wrong in thinking that a mode is descriptive. Thus, Devitt claims to 
partially vindicate Frege’s idea of sense as “mode of presentation,” although his own 
version of Frege’s insight diverges significantly from Frege’s conception. Devitt 
argues for a “less intellectualized” solution that avoids the flaws of Cartesian and 
direct reference views, but still explains “what ties the ability to the object.” 
 
Devitt develops Kripke’s (1972, 298, 346, fn. 22; 1980, 91) adumbration of the idea 
that it is a causal chain rather than any description which determines reference. 
Bianchi (2011, 264) has suggested that Kripke’s picture of such communication links 
“may seem naïve.” She complains, “even today, forty years later, we do not possess a 
fully blown theory built on this picture.” In response, Devitt (2012) claims to have 
elaborated the idea into a more complete theory which is as “full blown” as one can 
expect under current limitations of our knowledge. However, I suggest that, if we take 
the idea of causal chains and networks seriously, Devitt’s account of reference 
“grounding” and “borrowing” fails in a familiar way to provide an explanation. 
Indeed, his account has the virtue of making more explicit the Kripkean intuition and 
its serious flaws. Despite its naturalistic, scientific ambitions, Devitt admits that his 
views “have the same sources as the views of direct reference philosophers” (1989, 
206) and, therefore, in the end, he doesn’t manage to extricate himself from the 
fundamental problem of construing the semantic project as “explaining how names 
related to the world” (1989, 211).  
 
Raising	  Eyebrows	  
 
Devitt explains “competence with the name is simply an ability with it that is gained 
in a grounding or reference borrowing” through the chain of causal links (Devitt and 
Sterelny hereafter D&S, 1999, 67). Devitt’s causal chain explanation is undoubtedly 
an answer to a certain kind of question, but not a theory of naming ability or 
competence, as he claims, except in a Pickwickian sense. A dog or doorknob present 
at the dubbing doesn’t “gain an ability” to use a name, despite sharing the same causal 
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circumstances. Of course, it is not the ability as such that is gained on such occasions. 
Rather the pre-existing ability is used to add a new name to one’s repertoire. On 
Devitt’s model, when I buy a tennis racquet endorsed by Roger Federer, I also acquire 
his “competence” to play.  
 
I have acknowledged, of course, that the naïve causal theory captures a certain 
compelling intuition. Scriven (1959) famously drew attention to the variety of 
questions and the diverse family of explanations that may be made. He notes “The 
most cursory examination of both scientific and historical writing makes it clear that 
there are many occasions when questions beginning What, How, Who, Which, Where 
and When produce explanations; and explanations are also given in response to the 
raising of eyebrows” (1959, 451). Although Devitt claims his account to be 
“theoretically motivated,” the elaboration of Kripke’s causal chain of reference 
“borrowing” is simply an explanation of the origins of a name and why we 
conventionally use it in referring to someone. The intuitive appeal of the causal 
“theory” is derived from the fact that there is undoubtedly a chain of transmission, but 
this history is irrelevant to the way that each individual must acquire the competence 
to use the inscription-type or sound-pattern.  
 
Devitt’s account bears an affinity to Bromberger’s (1992, 83,4) illustration of 
spurious explanations. Undoubtedly, we explain how we know the height of a flag-
pole by citing the length of its shadow and the angle of the sun’s rays, but this is not 
the answer to a scientific explanatory question about the height of the flag-pole. 
Among the different possible projects that might be associated with causal 
explanations (Woodward 2001, 161), at best, Devitt’s communicative chain of 
reference “borrowing” is a paradigm singular-causal, historical explanation typically 
offered in the fashion of Scriven’s (1959) inkwell example (see Hempel 1965). A 
sequence of events explains why the carpet was stained with ink by adverting to 
someone’s knee hitting the table which turned over the ink bottle which poured out 
the ink which ran over the edge and dripped on to the carpet. (see Woodward 2003, 
156). Woodward points out the litany of problems confronting singular-causal claims 
as explanations of relations between events. He notes, that there is no reason to think 
that single events can be identified with cause-and-effect events in a causal claim and, 
  
Often, the events related in a singular-causal claim will correspond to what, 
from the perspective of the underlying scientific framework, are complex, 
spatially and temporally distributed, gerrymandered and unnatural-looking 
congeries of events falling under many different laws. (Woodward 2003, 169) 
 
Devitt claims that his “naturalistic” causal account achieves as good an explanation as 
we can reasonably expect given currently available knowledge. However, since we 
are unlike ink bottles when we display a competence in using names, such a singular-
causal historical explanation leaves out the most important factors just as Skinner’s 
stimuli neglected or disguised the internal mental processes involved in “verbal 
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behaviour.” Devitt’s epithet “Cartesian” is empty disparagement of what is the only 
remotely plausible (and emphatically naturalistic) explanation – namely, one that 
adverts to internal psychological processes and representations, that is, our descriptive 
concepts associated with a name. 
 
Devitt denies that “we have Cartesian access to meanings” (1996, 172,73). Of course, 
we may concede that naming competence “does not require any knowledge about the 
sense” or intentional “knowledge that” regarding senses. However, most explanations 
in good standing throughout psychology posit internal processes that are not 
“knowledge” in this special, philosophical sense. Propositional knowledge “that” 
something is the case can hardly exhaust the resources of internalist psychological 
theories. Most of cognitive science, and the most plausible account of Fregean senses 
as “modes of presentation,” is a story about the internal representations that subserve 
our mental capacity or naming competence. 
 
The emptiness of the causal account is evident in Devitt’s attempt of to make it do the 
work of a psychological theory by terminological fiat. It is telling that, although 
Devitt claims that Cartesianism has been undermined by the Direct Reference 
revolution and is “almost entirely unsupported,” it is the one that his own theory 
clearly, though implicitly, relies upon and insinuates, as suggested in his emphasis on 
“abilities to designate,” “mental representation,” and “cognitive values” (1989, 211), 
“grasping” (D&S 1999, 67),  “competence with a name” (D&S 1999, 69), “ability 
gained” (D&S 1999, 68). In Devitt’s use of the term, even the “cognitive fix” that 
establishes reference is an external causal influence. Thus, there is nothing cognitive 
in Devitt’s version of “cognitive values” since his version of Frege’s “mode of 
presentation” transposes it into an external, causal chain, though this cannot explain a 
naming ability and “actual knowledge.” Of course, Devitt is free to define the special 
Fregean terms such as “mode of presentation” as he chooses, but he uses “cognitive 
value” in the way we might speak of a “criminal lawyer” when we don’t really mean 
it pejoratively. In a revealing example, Devitt explains empty names with his external, 
causal account of sense by suggesting that in such cases “the sense is the property of 
purporting to designate an object by such a link” (D&S 1999, 67; emphasis added). 
How external links in a causal chain might “purport” to refer is not explained. Of 
course, in Chomsky’s (1959, 31) words, this device is as simple as it is empty. It is 
Cartesianism in disguise.6 
 
Lightening	  the	  epistemic	  burden.	  
 
For Devitt a name’s meaning is not cognitive but, rather, “a non Fregean sense 
explained in terms of a causal network” (Devitt 1989, 211). Thus, he seeks to explain 
“competence with a name” and “grasping its sense” in what he terms “a 
psychologically austere way” (D&S 1999, 67). However, there is no reason for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Barker (2006, 16) refers to Wettstein’s account as “descriptive theory in disguise” in the same sense. 
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thinking that psychological “austerity” is a virtue when we seek to explain language 
or any other mental ability. Thus, a name is alleged to be “largely external to the mind 
and beyond the ken of the ordinary speaker” (D&S 1999, 67). Indeed, Devitt says that 
on his account “The connection between names and identifying beliefs is cut” and, 
therefore, “The epistemic burden is lightened” (D&S 1999, 69). We might similarly 
“lighten the epistemic burden” with a theory of vision or any other mental 
competence at the cost of having no explanation.  
 
This appeal to facts “external to the mind” is just the one Chomsky (1959) had 
criticized in Skinner’s Verbal Behavior. In particular, Skinner’s use of terms such as 
“stimulus control” disguised the mentalist assumptions on which they implicitly 
relied.7 Departing from Frege’s cognitive conception, Devitt (D&S 1999, 68) 
proposes that the causal theory can “emulate the description theory” (D&S 1999, 67) 
in accounting for both sense and reference of a name. External causal chains 
substitute for Frege’s own notion of sense understood as a “mode of presentation.” On 
Devitt’s view, the Causal theory explains the “cognitive fix” which is actually a 
network of links “from thoughts to peripheral stimuli and by links from stimuli to the 
external world” (Devitt 1989, 222). 
 
The charge of Behaviourism may appear unfair on the grounds that Devitt explicitly 
acknowledges “explanation must frequently involve the mind” (1989, 222). Indeed, 
Devitt (forthcoming) says that the ability to use a name is only “partly explained by a 
causal connection to an object” where the linguistic competence itself will be 
explained by psycholinguistics. However, despite acknowledging that “Very little is 
known” about the psycholinguistic matters underlying naming ability, Devitt suggests 
that this ignorance “should not be of much concern to a theory of names.” In other 
words, the explanatory burden is placed mainly on external causes which give the 
illusion of explanation, as we have seen, by disguising their dependence upon an 
internal, mental account.8 
 
Devitt (forthcoming) says “But the causal theory does have something to say about 
what makes something an ability to designate one object in particular with one name 
in particular, about what ties the ability to that object and that name.” However, when 
we turn presently to consider causal networks, we will see that this tie between object 
and name is also an illusion because, among all the causal chains in a vast ramified 
net, we can trace a path backwards to a specific dubbing event only in hindsight. To 
paraphrase and adapt Chomsky’s remarks on external stimuli, since causes are free for 
the asking, we can account for the wide class of naming occasions by identifying the 
controlling causes. But the word cause has lost all objectivity in this usage. Causes are 
no longer part of the outside physical world; they are driven back into the organism. 
We identify the cause when we hear the name. It is clear from such examples, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See John Collins’ (2007) reconsideration of Chomsky’s review of Skinner. 
 
8 Devitt’s position is reflected also in his explicit nominalism (Devitt 2006b) that takes “linguistic 
reality” to reside in external tokens rather than types. See criticism by Smith (2006) and Slezak (2009). 
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abound, that the talk of causal chains simply disguises a complete retreat to 
mentalistic psychology. In particular, Chomsky gives examples of the use of proper 
names by someone who has never been stimulated by the corresponding objects. 
These are instances of stimulus control of the kind Devitt claims for causal chains, but 
Chomsky remarks that they “merely add to the general mystification” (Chomsky 
1959, 32). 
 
Intentional	  Magic	  and	  Movement	  of	  the	  Soul:	  “Extramission”	  
 
Indeed, Stalnaker (2003, 178) suggests that the only alternative to descriptive 
accounts seems to be “some kind of obscurantist intentional magic.” And Searle 
(1969, 87), too, remarks that without description, our ability to mean or intend a 
particular object to the exclusion of all others seems like a “movement of the soul.” 
Indeed, these referential intuitions are suggestive of widely held, compelling 
misconceptions concerning visual perception that are thought to involve emanations 
from the eyes – the so-called “extramission theory of perception” maintained by early 
Greek philosophers.9 Remarkably, following Piaget, Winer et al. (2002) report 
evidence that belief in extramission remains widespread, deeply ingrained and 
resistant to educational efforts. I don’t mean to suggest that such theories are literally 
believed by philosophers, but the compelling conceptions are very suggestive of 
intuitions underlying the most widely held idea of how words “hook onto” their 
objects. 
 
Searle (1969, 93) suggests, “It is misleading, if not downright false, to construe the 
facts which one must possess in order to refer as always facts about the object 
referred to, for that suggests that they are facts about some independently identified 
object (See also Stalnaker 2003, 185). Searle argues that if an expression has no 
descriptive content, “then there could be no way of establishing a connection between 
the expression and the object.” He asks “What makes this expression refer to that 
object?” Devitt (forthcoming) gives an explicit answer to this question with his causal 
account of “what makes something an ability to designate one object in particular 
with one name in particular.” As we have seen, for Devitt, the answer is nothing 
epistemic or intellectual but rather “a designating-chain grounded in that object.” 
 
Causal	  Networks:	  Baptism	  or	  Big	  Bang?	  
 
Wettstein (1986, 193) has noted that “advocates of this approach have never provided 
an account of what exactly the semantic function of the historical chain is.” More 
emphatically, Dummett (1973, 148) remarks on the irrelevance of a chain of 
communication to our understanding of language or our competence in the actual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 I am grateful to Justin Colley for drawing my attention to this case. 
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practice of naming.10 An indication of the reasons was given by Mackie (1980, 34,5) 
referring to the fact that “causal statements are commonly made in some context, 
against a background which includes the assumption of some causal field.” Thus, 
“what is said to be caused, then, is not just an event, but an event-in-a-certain-field.” 
Anything that is part of the assumed field of events will not be considered as a 
relevant cause but this attitude must be seen as “reflecting some conversational or 
other purpose of the speaker” (1980, 36). This pragmatic aspect of identifying cause 
and effect is also articulated by van Fraassen (1980, 123) who refers to the scientific 
picture of the world as “a net of interconnected events, related to each other in a 
complex but orderly way.”11 This is just the framework to which Devitt appeals in 
order to explain “a nonFregean sense” but it is just hand-waving in the absence of any 
attention to how causal networks could conceivably serve the explanatory purpose 
that Devitt claims for them. When we look at such models, we see that Devitt’s ideas 
of reference “grounding” and “borrowing” arise from the same misleading externalist 
intuitions behind direct reference theories.  
 
As it happens, there has been an explosive literature in philosophy and psychology on 
causal networks or Bayes Nets (Woodward 2003, 2012, Sloman 2005, Glymour 2001, 
Pearl, 1995, 2000, Lambrozo 2010). This picture has been elaborated in the apparatus 
of Causal Bayes nets represented in diagrams – “directed acyclic graphs.” The nodes 
in such a graph represent events and the arrows represent causal links between them. 
 
	  
 
Figure 2.  Bayes causal net (Gopnik and Schulz 2009, 4) 
 
Such causal diagrams permit us to visualize van Fraassen’s (1980, 124) account and 
its direct bearing on Devitt’s theory of naming ability. Van Fraassen (1977, 149) 
points to the systematic ambiguity or context-dependence of why-questions and notes 
the relevance of “concerns brought from outside.” He notes that such outside 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The point is precisely analogous to Putnam’s (1967, 18) attempt to rebut Chomsky’s “innateness” 
claims by citing the common historical origin of human languages to explain language universals. 
However, such an account leaves untouched the question of acquisition – that is, how each individual 
must accomplish the task of becoming a competent speaker. 
 
11 I am indebted to Michael Slezak for guidance on the literature and helpful discussion of causation. 
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concerns are relevant “even if we ask specifically for an ‘efficient cause,’ [and] for 
how far back in the chain we should look?” Woodward, too, asks “why suppose … 
that the underlying scientific framework posits single events to be identified with the 
cause-and-effect events in the original causal claim?” Van Fraassen notes, 
“Explanation of why an event happens consists (typically) in an exhibition of salient 
factors in the part of the causal net formed by lines “leading up to” that event.”  
 
In other words, the salient feature picked out as ‘the cause’ in that complex 
process, is salient to a given person because of his orientation, his interests, and 
various other peculiarities in the way he approaches or comes to know the 
problem – contextual factors. (van Fraassen 1980, 125) 
 
Even in the simplest networks with a few causal links such as cases of “double 
prevention” (Woodward 2012, Lambrozo 2012), it is difficult to draw firm 
conclusions about causal connections. A modest, realistic causal network helps to 
dramatise the retrospective selectivity. The following model encodes medical 
knowledge of a cardiac system. What is the cause of blood pressure at node (5)? 
 
 
 
Figure3.  from Beinlich et. al. 1989. 
 
It is clear that on Devitt’s account of naming, we choose the dubbing of Aristotle 
rather than the Big Bang not because one is a cause of our “ability” and the other is 
not. Rather, we have a specific pragmatic interest which governs our backward 
tracing of the path through the causal network. Devitt’s appeal to causal networks 
simply disguises the tacit operation of Donnellan’s omniscient observer of history – 
the “extramission” illusion.  
 
 26	  
Blindness	  or	  Shiftiness?	  
  
Despite frequent pronouncements that Kripke’s account has refuted and displaced 
descriptivism to become the received view, a descriptivist insurgency continues to 
defend the Russell-Frege account of proper names essentially along the lines of 
Dummett’s (1973) ‘wide scope’ analysis (Devitt 1981, Sosa 2001). Soames (2002) 
argues that all such attempts to circumvent Kripke’s case and to reinstate 
descriptivism fail against “decisive” objections, but the ongoing debate is revealing 
about the issues of interest here. Soames’ argument against descriptivism is itself 
vulnerable to the charge that it trades on the ambiguity of key expressions (Hunter 
2005, Baumann 2010). In the usual example, the definite description in (2) might not 
refer to Aristotle and, therefore, cannot be the meaning of the proper name in (1). 
 
(1)  Aristotle was fond of dogs 
(2)  The last great philosopher of antiquity was fond of dogs 
 
Dummett remarks “a mere reliance on intuition is not, in such a case, a guarantee that 
there really is a clear notion here” (1973, 125). Indeed, Hughes’ (2004) disconcerted 
reaction to Dummett is interesting in the light the persistence of descriptivist 
arguments against Kripke’s intuitions (Sosa 2001, Nelson 2002, Stanley 1997). 
Hughes (2004) professes “blindness” to the ambiguity of crucial sentences, but there 
can be no doubt about the existence and cogency of the alternative readings. As Sosa 
(2001, 26) notes, the phenomenon of ambiguity is widespread in the English language 
and the “shiftiness” of linguistic constructions containing modal expressions is akin to 
lexical ambiguity of words such as “bank.” Closer are the structural ambiguities 
familiar to linguists and the basis for jokes such as Groucho Marx’s remark: “One 
morning I shot an elephant in my pajamas.” Failure to appreciate the humour through 
blindness to the ambiguity is a psychological defect rather than theoretical criticism.12  
 
Dummett argues that Kripke wants to give different explanations for descriptions and 
proper names and with the latter he does not acknowledge a role for scope ambiguity. 
Instead, Kripke invokes different kinds of possibility and necessity – epistemic and 
metaphysical. Thus, Kripke’s doctrine of rigid designators rests partly on such modal 
intuitions, but Dummett shows that a theory of proper names as disguised definite 
descriptions has no difficulty with the crucial phenomena. Scope ambiguity in modal 
statements can apply to both names and descriptions “which accordingly cannot be 
used to differentiate the two types of expression” (Dummett 1973, 113). Overall, 
Dummett suggests “these considerations, so far from providing grounds against the 
assimilation of proper names to definite descriptions, supply substantial evidence in 
its favour.” (Dummett 1973, 116).  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 For those afflicted, Groucho adds “How he got into my pajamas I’ll never know.” 
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A	  disgrace	  to	  the	  human	  race?	  
 
More recently, Sosa (2001, 4,7) develops and defends the descriptivist account of 
proper names along Dummett’s lines. In particular, Sosa notes that ambiguity 
predicted by Russell’s theory of descriptions for a sentence such as (2) is reflected in 
the intuitive understanding of the sentence. Sosa (2001, 19) draws attention to 
Russell’s (1919) emphasis on the two crucially different senses of “is” – namely, the 
“is” of identity and the copula. Sosa says “I echo Russell’s lamentation of our 
ambiguity in this regard.” When this distinction is respected, we can see “Aristotle 
was the teacher of Alexander” is ambiguous between a statement of identity and the 
statement “Aristotle taught Alexander.” As always, we can see the alternative 
readings of ambiguous statements when placed in an appropriate context. Thus, we 
might make a sequence of statements “Aristotle met Alexander; Aristotle walked with 
Alexander; Aristotle spoke to Alexander” and, we might add “Aristotle was the 
teacher of Alexander,” not to assert an identity but to make a further attribution. On 
the other hand, of course, the same sentence may be used to assert an identity as when 
we say “You can’t imagine who had been the teacher of Alexander the Great of 
Macedon! Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander.” Soames (2002, 29) insists that 
“there is no sense in which … Aristotle might not have been Aristotle” but Sosa 
(2001, 23) points out, “It is not to be ignored, in this connection, that there are, in fact, 
ways of using proper names to indicate that they should take narrow scope” (see also 
Baumann 2010, 187). As Baumann (2010, 187) notes, sentences abstractly considered 
such as “Aristotle might not have been Aristotle” do not express a determinate 
proposition. To do so, the truth-conditional value of the name must have been decided 
and the “is” must be disambiguated. Russell expressed this concern as follows: 
 
It is a disgrace to the human race that it has chosen to employ the same word 
“is” for these two entirely different ideas – a disgrace which a symbolic logical 
language of course remedies. (1919, 172). 
 
Dummett (1973, 117) characterizes sentences as ontically necessary (or contingent) if 
they are true independently of the means available to us for recognizing them as true. 
Kripke reserves the word “necessary” for metaphysical necessities of this kind, using 
the term “a priori” for what Dummett refers to as epistemic necessities. Dummett 
(1973, 120) argues that necessity had little to do with the behaviour of proper names 
and definite descriptions in modal contexts and suggests that Kripke wishes to 
dissociate the necessary/contingent distinction from epistemic considerations 
altogether “But this he fails to do” (1973, 124). From the point of view of my theme, 
Dummett’s conclusion is noteworthy in speaking of the need “to invoke the 
conception of a being whose powers of observation or mental capacities transcended 
ours in a given respect”: 
 
The analogy which we implicitly rely on is with a hypothetical observer not 
subject to the restrictions to which we ourselves are subject. … we tacitly 
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appeal to the notion of an observer who is able to survey the whole infinite 
domain within a finite time. … (Dummett 1973, 119) 
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